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Modernizing Jury Instructions
in the Age of Social Media
By David E. Aaronson and Sydney M. Patterson

F

ollowing a jury trial in Vermont, the defendant, a
Somali Bantu immigrant, was convicted of aggravated sexual assault on a child. A juror obtained
information on the Internet about Somali culture and religion, a subject that played a significant role at trial, which
the juror discussed for 10–15 minutes during deliberations
to support his own position. The Vermont Supreme Court
reversed, finding prejudicial error because this information had the capacity to affect the jury’s verdict, as jurors
could have relied on it to interpret the testimony of the
Somali witnesses and determine the credibility of these
witnesses. (State v. Abdi, 45 A.3d 29 (Vt. 2012).)
In the political corruption trial of former Baltimore
Mayor Sheila Dixon, five jurors used social media to have
direct, case-related communications with one another
while the trial was still proceeding. The case, which resulted
in the conviction of Dixon, was challenged after the verdict
when Dixon’s attorneys discovered that the five jurors had
become Facebook friends during the course of the trial
and had posted discussions about the trial on their pages.
Dixon’s attorneys alleged that the five “Facebook Friends”
may have bullied other jurors into the guilty verdict, contending that they were “a caucus separate and apart” from
their colleagues. Before presiding Circuit Court Judge Dennis Sweeney questioned the jurors about their conduct,
which was in direct violation of his specific instruction to
avoid discussing the case on social media sites, the prosecutors and Dixon reached a plea deal that ended Dixon’s
appeals. (See Dennis Sweeney, Social Media and Jurors,
43 Md. B.J. 44, 46 (2010).)
However, Judge Sweeney did question one juror who
had posted “F--- the Judge” on his Facebook page after
Judge Sweeney had called a hearing on the matter. Judge
Sweeney reportedly asked the juror about his offensive
comment and was told, “Hey Judge, that’s just Facebook
stuff.” (See Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go Off Track, Reuters Legal (Dec. 8, 2010), http://
tinyurl.com/9nt4umx.)
These cases illustrate the two broad categories of

improper juror social media use: (1) use of the Internet
to conduct research, investigating facts or the law; and
(2) use of social media to contact others or post/publish
information. (See Caren Myers Morrison, Can the Jury
Trial Survive Google?, 25 Crim. Just. 4, 5 (Winter 2011).)
The use of social media is now an integral part of the
communication lexicon. It is commonplace to communicate and do research electronically through the use of
e-mail, text messaging, or Twitter, through blogs and
websites, such as Wikipedia, and search engines, such as
Google, or other social networking websites, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and YouTube.
Social media use by jurors poses many new litigation challenges and increases the risk of familiar jury concerns, such
as exposure to news and media accounts of a trial that contain material not admitted into evidence. Juror misconduct
using social media may have a direct impact on the administration, fairness, and integrity of the criminal justice system.
In modern jury trials, judges, the parties, and their attorneys
expect that many, if not most, jurors use social media.
Unlike inadmissible or stricken evidence heard by a jury
during trial, ex parte information a juror obtains online
cannot be addressed by the court with a curative or limiting instruction to correct any prejudicial effects. (See, e.g.,
Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887) (holding that a trial
should not be suspended where an error in admission of
testimony can be corrected by its withdrawal with proper
instruction from the court to disregard it).) Both the state
and the defense are likewise deprived of the opportunity to
consider and address the ex parte information by tailoring
their case strategy or closing statement accordingly. Moreover, complications may arise during jury deliberations
because the individual jurors will not all be considering
the same evidence in reaching a verdict. Jurors who conduct online research may be tempted to share the results
of their research with their fellow jurors.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant
“the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State.” The Supreme Court held that the failure
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to provide a defendant with an impartial hearing “violates even the minimal standards of due process.” (Irvin
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721–22 (1961).) The Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury has been defined by
the courts as one “capable and willing to decide the case
solely on the evidence before it.” (See Smith v. Phillips,
455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).) Due process and the rules of
evidence provide that juries may consider only legally
admissible evidence that is subject to cross-examination
in open court. (See Ronald D. Spears, Looking for “Facts”
in All the Wrong Places, 98 Ill. B.J. 102 (2010).) Dispositive evidence may be kept out for various reasons, such
as the manner in which it was obtained, or because it is
determined to be unduly prejudicial. It is important that
jurors do not know what is excluded and why it is excluded.
A growing number of cases address issues arising from
allegations of improper juror use of social media. Between
1999 and 2010, 90 verdicts were challenged on the basis of
Internet-related juror misconduct, according to a Reuters
Legal study—more than half within a two-year period.
Of the 90 challenges, 28 were overturned or had mistrials
declared. In three-quarters of the cases in which judges
declined to declare mistrials, Internet-related juror misconduct was present. (See Grow, As Jurors Go Online, supra.)
Jury instructions are a critical component of efforts
to prevent juror social media-related misconduct. Professor Morrison observes: “The first line of defense is
obviously to address the issue in jury instructions.” (Morrison, Can the Jury Trial Survive Google?, supra, at 12; see
also Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Google, Gadgets, and Guilt:
Juror Misconduct in the Digital Age, 83 U. Colo. L. Rev.
409, 451–52 (2012) (noting that the majority of respondents to the author’s juror survey selected modernized jury
instructions as the most effective method of preventing
online research and improper communication by jurors);
Emily M. Janoski-Haehlen, The Courts Are All a “Twitter”: The Implications of Social Media Use in the Courts,
46 Val. U. L. Rev. 43, 61 (2011) (“Adopting pattern jury
instructions that specifically address the use of social
media sites is the most logical place to start.”).)
The purpose of this article is to discuss a sampling of
cases showing the need for social media jury instructions
and the range of misconduct in criminal cases that modern social media jury instructions should address; identify
criteria based on a review of federal and state social media
DAVID E. AARONSON is B.J. Tennery Scholar and Professor of
Law at the Washington College of Law, American University,
Washington, D.C., and director of its Trial Advocacy Program.
This article is based, in part, on a section from the 2011 cumulative
supplement to his book, Maryland Criminal Jury Instructions
and Commentary (LexisNexis:3rd ed., 2009). SYDNEY M.
PATTERSON is a judicial law clerk in Montgomery County,
Maryland. She is a 2011 graduate of the Washington College of
Law. As a law student, she provided research and editing assistance
the 2010 and 2011 cumulative supplements to Maryland Criminal
Jury Instructions and Commentary.

jury instructions that should be useful in evaluating any
pattern social media jury instruction; and, finally, to propose model instructions for jurisdictions seeking to adopt
or improve their social media jury instructions.

Illustrative Cases Involving Jury Misconduct

The following cases illustrate the need for modernizing
social media jury instructions and the range of juror misconduct that should be addressed. (For additional cases
in which allegations were made of improper juror use of
social media, see George L. Blum, Annotation, Prejudicial Effect of Juror Misconduct Arising from Internet
Usage, 48 A.L.R.6th 135 (2009); Eric P. Robinson, Jury
Instructions for the Modern Age: A 50-State Survey of
Jury Instructions on Internet and Social Media, 1 Reynolds Cts. & Media L.J. 307 (2011). See generally Eric P
Robinson, Blog L. Online, http://bloglawonline.com (last
visited Nov. 9, 2012) (covering the spectrum of blog and
Internet law and policy, including up-to-date coverage of
emerging cases involving juror misconduct).)
Improper use of the Internet to conduct research, investigating facts or the law. Trial safeguards may be significantly
compromised when jurors conduct online research about
the case without the knowledge of the court or trial counsel. Conducting Internet research allows a juror to read
media stories about the crime, find personal information
about the parties, including criminal history, and even view
the scene of the crime using Google Maps’ Street View, all
without leaving the courthouse or home. The vast amount
of information available increases the likelihood that the
juror may be influenced by information that is prejudicial,
unreliable, or inaccurate, or even evidence that has been
ruled inadmissible. (See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, Jury
2.0, 62 Hastings L.J. 1579, 1584 (2011).)
Despite instructions from the judge not to conduct
research on the case, a juror in a murder trial looked up
definitions online for the terms “livor mortis” and “algor
mortis” and the role it might have had in fixing the time
of a beating victim’s death. When asked about it, the
juror responded, “To me that wasn’t research. It was a
definition.” The Court of Special Appeals reversed the
conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that the juror’s
online search was in direct violation of the trial court
judge’s order prohibiting jurors from researching the case.
(Clark v. State, No. 0953/08 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 3,
2009) (unreported opinion); see also Dennis Sweeney,
Social Media and Jurors, supra, at 46.)
After repeated explicit instructions not to conduct Internet research, a juror in a capital murder trial researched
how a person could suffer “retinal detachment,” the injury
suffered by the victim. In the resulting contempt proceeding for misconduct, the juror’s attorney explained that the
juror misunderstood the judge’s instruction not to conduct
research, believing the judge was referring only to facts in
the case, not related issues such as how a person could suffer certain injuries. (Brian Grow, Juror Could Face Charges
for Online Research, Reuters Legal (Jan. 19, 2011), http://
tinyurl.com/9kjhjv2.)
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In a federal case, defendants were charged with illegally operating an Internet pharmacy. After seven weeks
of trial throughout which the judge gave repeated instructions not to conduct online research, it was discovered
during deliberations that nine of the 12 jurors had conducted Internet research about the case during the trial.
The jurors had Googled news articles, medical terms, the
lawyers, the defendants, and evidence that had been specifically excluded by the judge. One juror discovered that
a defendant had previously been implicated in a related
criminal matter—evidence the defendant’s attorney had
specifically moved in limine to exclude (See John Schwartz,
As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 18, 2009, at A1.)
Internet research conducted by a juror and shared with
fellow jury members does not always influence the jury’s
deliberative process to the extent that a mistrial or reversal
is warranted. A judge will consider the type of information
that resulted from the research in making this determination. For example, where a juror in California told his
fellow jurors that his online search for “great bodily injury”
retrieved no information, the court found that the juror’s
misconduct did not prejudice the defendant. The court
found no substantial likelihood that the information seen
by the juror in conducting the search of the term with no
special legal meaning influenced him in any way detrimental to the defendant. (See People v. Hamlin, 89 Cal. Rptr.
3d 402 (Ct. App. 2009).)
Improper use of the Internet to communicate with others.
Courts admonish jurors not to discuss the case among themselves prior to final deliberations to avoid having the jurors
form opinions before they have heard all of the evidence in
the case. In addition, jurors are admonished not to communicate about the case with third parties due to the concern
that jurors may reach a verdict on the basis of an improper
communication rather than the evidence admitted at trial.
Despite the apparent clarity of such jury instructions, a
more specific instruction that addresses social media use is
needed in order to adequately admonish jurors. Case law
suggests that many jurors do not understand that acts such
as tweeting or updating a Facebook status are the type of
communication or discussion that courts prohibit. For
many jurors, updating a Facebook status to reflect daily
thoughts and activities is a matter of habit, and they no
longer give it much thought. Others may simply determine
that updating a Facebook status is a one-sided communication and, therefore, not the type of communication
addressed by the court. (Hoffmeister, supra, at 433–34; see
also Paula Hannaford-Agor, Google Mistrials, Twittering
Jurors, Juror Blogs, and Other Technological Hazards, Ct.
Manager, Summer 2009, at 42–43 (2009) (stating that for
some, tweeting and blogging are simply an extension of
thinking, rather than a form of written communication).)
For example, the day before a verdict was announced in
a criminal trial in Michigan, a juror posted on her Facebook page that she was “actually excited for jury duty
tomorrow. It’s gonna be fun to tell the defendant they’re
GUILTY.” Defense counsel discovered the Facebook post

and reported the juror, who was removed prior to the
start of the second day of the two-day trial. (Hoffmeister, supra, at 429.)
After sentencing a gang member to prison for murder, a California judge reportedly “ripped into” the jury
foreman, holding him in contempt for writing a blog that
exposed the details of the case during trial. Despite daily
instructions to refrain from discussing the case, the jury
foreman had been blogging about the case throughout the
trial and deliberations, posting a photograph of the murder weapon, and running a chat room where people could
ask him questions about the case. In his testimony at the
contempt hearing, the foreman said he did not believe his
blog constituted “discussing the case” in defiance of the
judge’s instructions. (Raul Hernandez, Juror Held in Contempt for Blog of Murder Trial, Ventura County Star
(Jan. 23, 2008), http://tinyurl.com/9twxldd; see also State
v. Goupil, 908 A.2d 1256 (N.H. 2006).)
At the conclusion of the evidence in the sentencing
phase of a capital murder trial in Dimas-Martinez v. State,
2011 Ark. 515 (2011) a juror tweeted, “Choices to be made.
Hearts to be broken. We each define the great line.” (Id.,
slip op. at 12.) When the court questioned the juror, he
admitted that he had disregarded the court’s instruction
not to tweet about the case. The court denied the request
of counsel to remove the juror for his misconduct and the
fact that one of the juror’s Twitter followers was a reporter.
(Id.) Thereafter, during jury deliberations in the sentencing
phase of the trial, the juror tweeted, “If its [sic] wisdom
we seek . . . We should run to the strong tower.” (Id.,
slip op. at 14.) An hour before the jury announced that it
had reached a sentence, the juror tweeted, “Its [sic] over.”
(Id., slip op. at 15.) The trial court denied the defendant’s
motion for a new trial, finding that the defendant suffered
no prejudice. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the
defendant’s conviction and sentence, finding that the trial
court’s failure to acknowledge the juror’s inability to follow
the court’s directions was an abuse of discretion. The court
recognized that when jurors post musings, thoughts, or
any other information about trials on any online forums,
“[t]he possibility for prejudice is simply too high.” (Id., slip
op. at 16–17.) The court found that “[s]uch a fact is underscored in this case . . . because one of the juror’s Twitter
followers was a reporter.” (Id., slip op. at 17.)
In a civil auto accident case in Texas, a juror pleaded
guilty to four counts of contempt for trying to “friend”
the defendant on Facebook and for discussing the case on
his Facebook page. The misconduct was brought to the
attention of the trial judge after the defendant notified her
lawyer of the contact, and her lawyer informed the trial
judge. The juror was sentenced to two days of community service. (See Eva-Marie Ayala, Tarrant County Juror
Sentenced to Community Service for Trying to “Friend”
Defendant on Facebook, Fort Worth Star-Telegram,
Aug. 28, 2011.)
Many tweets or e-mails sent during trial may be
found to be innocuous, such as comments about jury
duty or lack of refreshments. For example, in the federal
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corruption trial of former Pennsylvania state senator Vincent Fumo, the district court held that a juror’s Facebook
posts and tweets, including one stating, “Stay tuned for a
big announcement on Monday everyone!” did not prejudice the defendant. The Third Circuit held that there
was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s finding
that the juror’s statements were innocuous. Far from raising specific facts about the trial or indicating any bias
toward the parties, the postings were “so vague as to be
virtually meaningless” and “nothing more than harmless
ramblings.” (United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 299,
305–06 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Michael C. Bromby, Paper
Presented at the Jury Research Symposium, Institute for
Advanced Studies, Glasgow: The Temptation to Tweet—
Jurors’ Activities Outside the Trial 2–4 (Mar. 25–26, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1590047.)

Distinguishing Harmless from Prejudicial Error

Improper use of social media by jurors, when discovered
and challenged, may be viewed by the trial and appellate
courts as harmless rather than prejudicial error. Judges
have substantial discretion to determine on a case-by-case
basis whether juror misconduct is prejudicial enough to
a criminal defendant or the state to warrant removing
the juror from the panel, declaring a mistrial, or, if on
appeal, reversing a conviction. When an issue of misconduct arises, the presiding judge has a duty to fully
investigate allegations of misconduct to assess the extent
of any prejudice. (See, e.g., Remmer v. United States, 350
U.S. 377, 379 (1956).)
Courts have assessed the prejudicial impact of juror misconduct involving Internet research by looking at the totality
of the circumstances, including the type of information that
resulted from the improper research, the stage of the trial
when the misconduct occurred, whether the extrinsic evidence
was communicated to the other jurors, and whether it related
to a material issue in the case. (See Amanda McGee, Note,
Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Century: The Prevalence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms,
30 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 301, 313–14 (2010).)
In drawing the line between prejudicial information
and harmless error, social psychologists Julie Blackman
and Ellen Brickman classify the nature of the information that jurors might discover online as falling within
five broad categories: (1) media accounts of the case;
(2) virtual physical or other factual evidence; (3) expert
opinions; (4) personal and professional information on
the parties involved, including the judge, attorneys, and
the defendant in criminal cases; and (5) the law (such as
researching sentences associated with conviction for the
particular crime charged). (Julie Blackman & Ellen Brickman, Let’s Talk: Addressing the Challenges of Internet-Era
Jurors, Jury Expert, Mar. 2011, at 7–8, available at http://
tinyurl.com/3r3gubf.)
While trial judges have considerable discretion to assess
whether juror misconduct is unduly prejudicial, they are
required to reasonably exercise this discretion. In State
v. Gunnell, 973 N.E. 2d 243 (Ohio 2012), the issue before

the Ohio Supreme Court was whether the trial court acted
unreasonably in addressing juror misconduct and in determining that a manifest necessity existed for a mistrial.
The misconduct involved a juror who conducted Internet
research on “involuntary manslaughter” and attempted
to bring the printed material into the jury room during
deliberations. The trial court questioned the juror about
the information she had found and why she had looked for
it, but did not ask her “a single question about the prejudice or bias, if any, created by the improper information or
her ability to disregard it.” (Id. at 247.) The Ohio Supreme
Court found that the trial court had not exercised sound
discretion in determining whether juror bias existed and
whether it could be cured. The court held that although it
was error for the juror to conduct outside research, “it was
also error for the judge to make no more than a limited
inquiry of the juror—an inquiry that merely established
the misconduct, not any prejudice from it.” (Id. at 251.)
Internet research consisting of looking up the meaning
of a word may not be found to be sufficiently prejudicial,
while research that uncovers an inadmissible prior conviction of the defendant is more likely to result in reversible
error. Misconduct involving research related to a material
issue in a case, such as a factual dispute or the credibility of
a witness or party is also more likely to be found prejudicial.
In Wardlaw v. State, 971 A.2d 331 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2009), a juror’s online research led the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals to order a new trial for the defendant accused
of rape of his 17-year-old daughter. At trial, the defendant’s
daughter testified that she had sex with the defendant on
three different occasions and that she had been diagnosed
with oppositional defiant disorder. A juror conducted online
research on “oppositional defiant disorder,” and reported to
the other jurors her finding that lying was associated with
the disorder. Because the daughter’s credibility was a crucial
issue, and there was no other evidence to substantiate her
allegations, the court found that the juror’s research constituted egregious misconduct and that the trial court’s failure
to question the jurors about the influence of the individual
juror’s online research required a reversal.

Other Remedies to Deter Misuse of Social Media

Many courts and legislatures have adopted remedies to
supplement social media jury instructions. The use of some
of these remedies may increase the effectiveness of social
media jury instructions.
A complementary response may include showing a film
to prospective jurors shortly after they report for jury duty,
illustrating prohibited uses of social media, explaining why
using social media is prohibited, and notifying them of the
penalties that may be imposed. The court’s social media jury
instructions might be included in this initial presentation.
Attorneys may use voir dire to ask prospective jurors,
or request the judge inquire, about their social media use
and whether they would be able to comply with the judge’s
instructions prohibiting improper social media use. Voir
dire may provide another opportunity to repeat the court’s
social media jury instructions and educate jurors at an
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early stage of the process.
Another suggestion is to require that jurors sign a written statement, possibly under oath, acknowledging that
they have been notified of prohibited social media uses
and agreeing to abide by the prohibitions, subject to penalties. (See Hoffmeister, supra, at 456–57.)
The threat of sanctions such as fines and contempt may
be helpful in deterring the kind of misconduct, such as
Facebook posts and tweets, which is easily detected. Also,
judges have discretion to confiscate all electronic devices
during jury deliberations or, in a trial of brief duration, for
the entire trial. (See Ralph Artigliere et al., Reining in Juror
Misconduct: Practical Suggestions for Judges and Lawyers,
Fla. B.J., Jan. 2010, at 8, 12.) Although it is not a widely
used remedy, a judge may require that jurors be sequestered

may lessen the likelihood that jurors will feel the need to
seek additional information on the Internet. (See Morrison, Jury 2.0, supra, at 1625–31 (supporting a more active
role for the jury on the ground that allowing them to ask
questions will reduce the urge to seek information online).)

Four Criteria for Modernizing Jury Instructions

Among the most practical and cost-effective solutions for
accommodating social media in the courtroom is to adopt
explicit and explanatory jury instructions that address
improper social media use.
Of the 47 states and the District of Columbia that
have compiled criminal jury instructions, 11 have yet
to formally adopt modern instructions that address the
Internet or social media. Thirty-six states and four federal

Voir dire may provide another opportunity to repeat
the court’s social media jury instructions and educate
jurors at an early stage of the process.
for the duration of the trial or during jury deliberation.
Some of these approaches may discourage citizens from
serving as jurors. (Hoffmeister, supra, at 436–41; see also
Dennis M. Sweeney, Md. Circuit Court Judge (Retired),
Address to the Litigation Section of the Maryland State
Bar Association: The Internet, Social Media and Jury
Trials: Lessons Learned from the Dixon Trial (Apr. 29,
2010) (transcript available at http://juries.typepad.com/
files/judge-sweeney.doc) (“Banning all cell phones, I-Pads
[sic], and laptops for everyone called in for jury duty is
unlikely to work and will be viewed as a Luddite solution
with little support in the jury pool.”).)
Under a California law, jurors who use electronic or
wireless communication to conduct their own research
on a case, or talk to outsiders about it, can be sentenced
to jail time of up to six months for criminal contempt.
(A.B. 141, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).) The law was
reportedly prompted by numerous accounts of jurors using
electronic devices to research or communicate about cases.
(Eric P. Robinson, New California Law Prohibits Jurors’
Social Media Use, Citizen Media L. Project (Sept. 1,
2011), http://tinyurl.com/9rw24jo.)
Other states have adopted different prophylactic measures
to supplement social media jury instructions. Michigan, for
example, recently implemented new jury reform rules that
attempt to reduce the incidence of “Google mistrials” by
aiming to “alleviate the stress jurors feel about not being
able to talk about the case.” (See Lindsay M. Sestile, Michigan Adopts New Jury-Reform Rules, Litig. News, Sept. 28,
2011.) The new jury reform rules include permitting jurors
to submit questions to witnesses through the judge and to
take their notes into the jury room for use during deliberations. (Mich. Admin. Code r. 2.513 (2011).)
Remedies that allow jurors to take on a more active role

circuits have adopted pattern criminal jury instructions
that address social media use with varying degrees of
specificity. Several of these states contain only blanket
admonitions not to use social media to research or communicate about the case. (See Robinson, Jury Instructions
for the Modern Age, supra.)
Based on a review of the criminal pattern jury instructions on improper social media use that have been adopted
by states and federal circuits and our review of applicable
case law, we have identified four criteria that jurisdictions
should consider in adopting or revising modern social
media jury instructions.
1. Use plain language and social media terminology.
Jury instructions should use plain language and common social media terminology that accurately describe
the prohibited social media conduct, such as “texting,”
“e-mailing,” “tweeting,” or “posting.” The cases discussed
above illustrate that many jurors do not understand that
prohibited “communications” or “discussions” include
a blog entry or a Facebook update and that prohibited
“research” means that jurors cannot use a dictionary or a
Google search to obtain the definition of a word they do
not understand. Jury instructions need to clearly describe
the types of information that may not be shared, such
as “facts,” “impressions,” “opinions,” “thoughts,” and
“reactions” about the case, any place discussed in the testimony, or any of the individuals participating in the trial,
including the parties, witnesses, attorneys, court personnel, and the judge. Using social media terminology in a
way that indicates an understanding of social media use
puts the admonition in context for jurors, encouraging
attentive listening and improving juror comprehension.
Hawaii’s standard criminal jury instruction, amended
in 2009 by the Hawaii Supreme Court to address juror
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use of social media, uses effective social media terminology in admonishing jurors not to communicate about the
case, stating, “No discussion also means no e-mailing, text
messaging, tweeting, [or] blogging. . . .” (Haw. Criminal
Jury Instructions 2.01 (rev. 2009); see also Jana Lauren
Harris, Social Media in the Jury Room Can Sabotage Trials, Findlaw Knowledge-Base, July 28, 2009 (“[D]o not
‘Google’ any party . . . ‘blog’ about the case or . . . ‘tweet’
about anything. . . .”).)
2. Give specific examples of prohibited social media
conduct. Providing specific examples of prohibited social
media reduces the likelihood of misinterpretation by individual jurors. (See Tricia R. DeLeon & Janelle S. Forteza,
Is Your Jury Panel Googling during the Trial?, 52 Advoc.
36, 38 (2010) (quoting statements made by Texas judges
suggesting that jurors do not think of their Internet activities as violating their jury instructions).) Instructions are
most effective when only a few selective examples are provided to jurors along with the rationale for the restrictions,
rather than an admonition consisting of a long list of
examples of prohibited social media conduct. By providing specific examples of prohibited social media use, such
as using Wikipedia or Googling to look up the definition
of a word or obtain other information about the case,
there is less ambiguity.
It is often not the means of conducting research that the
juror misunderstood, but the term “research” itself. (See
Grow, Juror Could Face Charges for Online Research, supra
(discussing a mistrial in Pennsylvania caused by a juror
who conducted online research about the injuries suffered
by the victim and later explained that she misunderstood
the judge’s instruction not to conduct research, believing
the judge was referring only to facts in the case, not related
issues such as how a person could suffer certain injuries).)
A proposed instruction by retired Maryland Circuit
Court Judge Dennis Sweeney addresses this issue by
instructing jurors not to conduct research and then defining what constitutes research: “I mean ‘research’ in the
broadest possible meaning of the word. That is, you cannot use a public library, a dictionary, or a simple Google
search to clarify or obtain, for example, even something
as simple as the definition of a word you do not understand.” (Dennis M. Sweeney, Worlds Collide: The Digital
Native Enters the Jury Box, 1 Reynolds Cts. & Media
L.J. 121 (2011).)
A predominant use of social media sites is to “post”
or “publish” information that may be directed to no one
in particular, yet viewable to everyone, using popular features like a tweet, a Facebook status, or a blog post. Given
its widespread popularity, this particular use of social
media should be specifically addressed in jury instructions to resolve any misconceptions jurors may entertain
regarding their duty not to communicate about the case.
As opposed to “communicating” or “discussing” information, which usually implies a two-sided interaction, this
particular use of social media is more accurately described
by using different terminology, such as “posting” or “publishing” information.

The ongoing emergence of new technology will likely
require periodic revisions to keep jury instructions updated
with current examples of social media misconduct. New
Mexico’s social media jury instructions include a blank
space meant to be filled in by the judge with up-to-date
illustrations. (N.M. Uniform Jury Instructions Criminal
14-101 (2011).) This type of provision provides built-in
flexibility and ensures that the instruction will be adaptable and well-tailored to new technology and social media.
3. Explain the rationale for social media restrictions.
Jurors who are provided with the rationale underlying
social media restrictions are less likely to arrive at the
mistaken conclusion that they have not run afoul of
the court’s admonitions. Also, jurors are more likely to
understand that compliance with the restrictions helps
ensure that the parties receive a fair trial. Jurors need
to be informed, for example, that tweeting case-specific information is prohibited because it divulges that
information to outsiders and may be viewable by a witness excluded from proceedings prior to testimony. In
addition, social media use can take many forms, and providing jurors with the rationale for the restrictions will
equip them with the means to evaluate their own social
media conduct and determine whether it falls within the
court’s admonition. Finally, jurors will be better able to
see the restrictions as meaningful and important, rather
than a boilerplate limitation on their conduct. For a
good example of a thorough rationale for social media
restrictions, see Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) 1 (2010) (preliminary instruction).
Our review of criminal pattern jury instructions on
improper social media use that have been adopted by federal circuits and the states leads us to conclude that the most
prevalent and serious deficiency is an inadequate explanation of the rationale for social media prohibitions. Professor
Morrison states: “Probably the most helpful way to give
instructions is to explain to jurors why they should not surf,
blog, or tweet during trial. If this instruction comes across
as nothing more than another admonition, jurors may well
shrug it off.” (Morrison, Can the Jury Trial Survive Google?,
supra, at 12–13.) Professor Hoffmeister adds:
Providing the “why” is important because jurors
in the Digital Age are more receptive to learning
information online. Moreover, many jurors today
feel comfortable using technology to discover facts
for themselves or communicate with others. As a
result, it is a challenge to get these jurors to give up
their methods of learning and acquiring information
and adhere to the court’s instructions.
(Hoffmeister, supra, at 453–54 (footnotes omitted).)
4. Describe the consequences of violating social media
restrictions. To further impress upon jurors the importance of the social media restrictions, courts should inform
jurors of the consequences of failing to adhere to them,
such as mistrials, resulting in a substantial waste of time
and resources, and disciplinary sanctions for jurors who
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violate the court’s instructions. Hoffmeister suggests the
following language:
If you communicate with anyone about the case or
do outside research during the trial, it could lead to
a mistrial, which is a tremendous expense and inconvenience to the parties, the court, and, ultimately, you
as taxpayers. Furthermore, you could be held in contempt of court and subject to punishment such as
paying the costs associated with having a new trial.
(Id. at 467.)

Application of Criteria to Illustrative Modern
Social Media Jury Instructions

The following are excerpts from selected jury instructions that address the two categories of social media use
in which most instances of juror misconduct occur: the use
of social media to conduct case-related research and the
use of social media to communicate or post/publish information about a case. In addition, the following instructions
also contain one or more of the four criteria for effective
social media jury instructions discussed above.
US Judicial Conference. On August 21, 2012, the US
Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration
and Case Management approved a model jury instruction
to help deter jurors from using social media to research
or communicate about cases on which they serve. The
instruction is an updated version of a prior social media
instruction adopted in January 2010.The following is an
excerpt from the updated 2012 instruction:
You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on
the evidence presented here within the four walls of
this courtroom. This means that during the trial you
must not conduct any independent research about
this case, the matters in the case, and the individuals or corporations involved in the case. In other
words, you should not consult dictionaries or reference materials, search the internet, websites, blogs, or
use any other electronic tools to obtain information
about this case or to help you decide the case. Please
do not try to find out information from any source
outside the confines of this courtroom.
....
I know that many of you use cell phones, Blackberries, the internet and other tools of technology.
You also must not talk to anyone at any time about
this case or use these tools to communicate electronically with anyone about the case. This includes
your family and friends. You may not communicate with anyone about the case on your cell phone,
through e-mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging,
or on Twitter, through any blog or website, including Facebook, Google+, My Space, LinkedIn, or
YouTube. You may not use any similar technology
of social media, even if I have not specifically mentioned it here. I expect you will inform me as soon
as you become aware of another juror’s violation

of these instructions.
(U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Court Admin. &
Case Mgmt., Proposed Model Jury Instruction on the
Use of Electronic Technology to Conduct Research on
or Communicate about a Case (June 2012).)
Minnesota. Recognizing the need to use plain language
jury instructions, Minnesota’s criminal jury instructions
provide two versions of its preliminary criminal instruction, an original version and a more simplified plain
language version. A note to judges in the instructions
explains, “Each judge will probably find jurors respond
best to a statement about the process and the case that is
phrased as naturally as possible by the judge.” (10 Minnesota Practice, Jury Instruction Guides—Criminal
(CRIMJIG) ch. 1, n.1 (5th ed. 2010).) The following is
an excerpt from the plain language version:
When you go home during the trial, do not talk to
your family, friends, or others about the case. You
may tell them you are a juror on a criminal case and
that is all that you should tell them. Do not report
your experiences as a juror while the trial and deliberations are going on. Do not e-mail, blog, tweet,
text or post anything to your Facebook, MySpace,
or other social networking sites about this trial. Do
not visit any “chat rooms” where this case may be
discussed.
Do not read or listen to news reports about the case.
Do not do your own investigation. Do not ask people about this case. Do not visit any of the locations
mentioned in the trial. Do not research anything
about the case, including the issues, evidence, parties,
witnesses, location, or the law, through any form of
written, print, electronic or Internet media.
....
If you do not follow these instructions, you may
jeopardize the trial. This may require the whole trial
to be redone and we will have to start over.
(Id. at CRIMJIG 2.08.)
Idaho. Instructions in this article are based, in part, on
Idaho’s criminal jury instruction on juror conduct. Idaho’s
instruction improves juror comprehension by addressing
social media restrictions as they apply to specific popular uses of social media, such as looking up information
online as a matter of routine. The instruction also accomplishes this by addressing social media using the popular
terminology, such as “Googling,” the most common way
of referring to looking something up on the Internet.
Instructions not to “Google” anything makes it instantly
clear to jurors the type of conduct that is prohibited.
In our daily lives we may be used to looking for
information on-line and to “Google” something as
a matter of routine. Also, in a trial it can be very
tempting for jurors to do their own research to make
sure they are making the correct decision. You must
resist that temptation for our system of justice to
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work as it should. I specifically instruct that you must
decide the case only on the evidence received here in
court. If you communicate with anyone about the
case or do outside research during the trial it could
cause us to have to start the trial over with new jurors
and you could be held in contempt of court.
(Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions 108 (2010).)
Utah. The “model” jury instruction we propose below is
based, in part, on Utah’s criminal jury instruction, which
contains elements of all the criteria suggested for effective social media instructions. Utah’s instruction is also
unique in that it references the growing number of trials
that have been disrupted by jurors who have failed to abide
by social media restrictions. The reference to real events
may be more effective in commanding the interest and
attention of the jury because it lessens the impression of
being a boilerplate admonition. Also, Utah’s instruction
is unusual because it attempts to cast doubt in the minds
of jurors that they can avoid the consequences of violating the court’s instructions by doing so surreptitiously, or
by evading detection until after the conclusion of the trial.
Jurors have caused serious problems during trials by using
computer and electronic communication technology. You
may be tempted to use these devices to investigate the
case, or to share your thoughts about the trial with others. However, you must not use any of these electronic
devices while you are serving as a juror.
You violate your oath as a juror if you conduct your own
investigations or communicate about this trial with others,
and you may face serious consequences if you do. Let me
be clear: do not “Google” the parties, witnesses, issues, or
counsel; do not “Tweet” or text about the trial. . . .
Please understand that the rules of evidence and
procedure have developed over hundreds of years in
order to ensure the fair resolution of disputes. The
fairness of the entire system depends on you reaching
your decisions based on evidence presented to you
in court, and not on other sources of information.
Post-trial investigations are common and can disclose these improper activities. If they are discovered,
they will be brought to my attention and the entire
case might have to be retried, at substantial cost.
(Model Utah Jury Instructions, Criminal 109B (2d ed.
2010) (recess admonition).)

Proposed “Model” Social Media Jury Instructions

Needless to say, there is no “perfect” social media instruction, and some jurors will disregard any social media
jury instruction. The effectiveness of an instruction will
depend, in part, on such factors as the delivery of the
instructions, their repetition at various points throughout
the trial, and the use of complementary remedies to deter
social media misconduct.
The proposed social media jury instructions, below,
are based on jury instructions published in the 2011
Supplement to Maryland Criminal Jury Instructions and

Commentary. They include two versions of the instruction:
an “amplified instruction” to be given at the beginning and
conclusion of the trial and an “abbreviated instruction” to
be given, as appropriate, before a recess and before jurors
leave for home at the end of a trial day.

Social Media Cautioning: Beginning and
End of Trial (Amplified Instruction)

There are rules that each of you must follow in order
to have a fair trial in this case. If you fail to follow
these rules, you violate your oath as a juror and may
face serious consequences. You must not be exposed to
any information other than the evidence presented in
this courtroom. This includes any information about
issues or people involved in this trial. I now want to
give you a detailed explanation about what you should
and should not do during your time as jurors.
First, do not communicate to anyone any information about this case, or disclose your thoughts
about this case or the individuals participating in
it. This includes, but is not limited to, discussing the
evidence, the lawyers, the court, or your thoughts,
opinions, and reactions about any aspect of the case.
In addition to not talking face to face with anyone,
you must not share information with anyone about
the case by any other means, for example, by texting,
emailing, tweeting, or posting on social-networking
sites such as Facebook. This includes not communicating with your fellow jurors until I give you the case
for deliberation. It also applies to communicating
with everyone else, including your family members
and your employer, although you may notify your
family and your employer that you have been seated
as a juror in the case.
Second, you must not conduct your own research
or investigation about the case or try to get information from any source other than what you see and
hear in the courtroom. I use the word “research”
in the broadest possible meaning of the word. This
means, for example, you cannot use a dictionary or a
Google search to obtain even something as simple as
the definition of a word you do not understand. You
must not consult any news sources, reference materials, or “Google” any information about the case, the
law that applies to the case, or the people involved,
including the defendant, the witnesses, the lawyers,
or myself. You must not do any personal investigation, including visiting any of the places related to
this case or viewing them on the Internet, for example, using Google Maps. This applies whether you
are in the courthouse, at home, or anywhere else.
In summary, you may not use any social media
technology to conduct your own investigation or
communicate about matters related to this case. Let
me be clear: do not “Google” the parties, witnesses,
issues, or counsel; do not “tweet” or text about the
trial; do not text or email information about the case;
do not post updates about the trial on Facebook; do

Published in Criminal Justice Volume 27, Number 4, Winter 2013. © 2013 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission.
All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an
electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

not use Google Maps or other Internet sources. Even
using something as seemingly innocent as “Wikipedia” to obtain information related to this case can
result in serious consequences.
It is important that you understand why these
rules exist and why they are so important:
Only you have been qualified to be jurors in this case
and only you have taken an oath to be fair and impartial.
The law does not permit you to talk among
yourselves about the case until I tell you to begin
deliberations because early discussions can lead to
a premature final decision.
In our daily lives we may be used to looking for
information online and to “Google” something as
a matter of routine. Also, in a trial it can be very
tempting for jurors to do their own research to make
sure they are making the correct decision, but you
must resist the temptation to seek outside information. Looking for outside information is unfair
because the parties do not have the opportunity to
refute, explain or correct what you have discovered.
The trial process works by each side knowing exactly
what evidence is being considered by you and what
law you are applying to the facts you find.
For this reason, you are not permitted to visit a
place discussed in the testimony. First, you cannot
always be sure that the place is in the same condition
as it was on the day in question. Second, even if it
were in the same condition, once you go to a place
discussed in the testimony to evaluate the evidence
in light of what you see, you become a witness, not
a juror. As a witness, you may now have a mistaken
view of the scene that may not be subject to correction by either party.
Finally, you must not read or listen to any news
accounts of the case, and you must not do research on
any fact, issue, or law related to the case. For instance,
the law often uses words and phrases in special ways,
so it’s important that any definitions you hear come
only from me, and not from any other source. Your
decision must be based solely on the testimony and
other evidence presented in this courtroom. It would
not be fair to the parties for you to base your decision
on some reporter’s view or opinion, or upon information you acquire outside the courtroom which may be
incomplete, misleading, or inaccurate.
These rules are designed to help guarantee a fair
trial. The fairness of the entire system depends on
your reaching your verdict based solely on the evidence presented to you in court. If you violate these
rules, you jeopardize the fairness of these proceedings and could be held in contempt of court. Also,
a mistrial could result that would require the entire
trial process to start over. As you can imagine, a mistrial is a tremendous expense and inconvenience to
the parties, the court, and the taxpayers. [Post-trial
investigations are common and can disclose these
improper activities. If they are discovered, they will

be brought to my attention and the entire case might
have to be retried.]
I trust that you understand and appreciate the
importance of following these rules and, based on
your oath and promise, I know you will do so.
[If any of you have any difficulty whatsoever in following these instructions, please notify the bailiff or
the clerk, who will notify me. If any of you become
aware that one of your fellow jurors has done something that violates these instructions, you are obligated
to report that as well. If a headline or announcement
catches your attention, do not read or listen further.
If anyone tries to contact you about the case, either
directly or indirectly, or sends you any information
about the case, please report this promptly as well.]
(David E. Aaronson, Maryland Criminal Jury Instructions and Commentary § 1.06(E) (3d ed. 2009 & Supp. 2011).

Social Media Cautioning:
During Trial (Abbreviated Instruction)

Let me remind you once again that you must decide
this case based only on the evidence introduced at
trial. You must not communicate or share any information with anyone about this case, or disclose your
thoughts about it or the individuals participating in
it. This includes, but is not limited to, discussing the
evidence, the lawyers, the court, or your thoughts,
opinions, and reactions about any aspect of the case.
In addition to not talking face to face with anyone
about the case, you must not communicate information about the case by any means, including texting,
emailing, tweeting, or posting on social-networking
sites like Facebook. You also must not read or listen to any news accounts of the case. Finally, you
must not conduct your own research or investigation about the case or try to get information from
any source other than what you see and hear in the
courtroom. This means, for example, you cannot
use a dictionary or a Google search to obtain even
something as simple as the definition of a word you
do not understand.
In summary, do not “Google” the parties, witnesses, issues, or counsel; do not “tweet” or text
about the trial; do not text or email information
on the case; do not post updates about the trial on
Facebook; do not use Google Maps or other Internet
sources. Even using something as seemingly innocent
as “Wikipedia” to obtain information related to this
case can result in serious consequences.
[If any of you have any difficulty whatsoever in following these instructions, please notify the bailiff or
the clerk, who will notify me. If any of you become
aware that one of your fellow jurors has done something that violates these instructions, you are obligated
to report that as well. If a headline or announcement
catches your attention, do not read or listen further.
If anyone tries to contact you about the case, either
directly or indirectly, or sends you any information
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about the case, please report this promptly as well.]
(Id. § 1.06(G).)

Conclusion

An increasing number of cases address issues arising from
allegations of juror misconduct using social media. At
least 36 states and four federal circuits have adopted jury
instructions that seek to deter juror misuse of social media
with varying degrees of specificity and effectiveness, as
reflected in the case law. A review of these jury instructions
suggests that effective social media instructions should
meet four criteria: (1) use plain language and social media

terminology; (2) give specific examples of prohibited social
media conduct; (3) explain the rationale for social media
restrictions; and (4) describe the consequences of violating
social media restrictions. The most common and serious
deficiency is an inadequate explanation of the rationale
for social media restrictions.
We propose two “model” jury instructions—an amplified and an abbreviated version—that should reduce juror
misunderstanding and confusion, enable jurors to better
understand the restrictions as meaningful and important,
and direct juror attention to the serious consequences of
violating the court’s instructions. n
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